the fourth amendment prohibits police officers from stopping an automobile and detaining the driver to check his license and registration unless they have at least articulable and reasonable suspicion of a law violation. 4 The Villamonte-Marquez Court, however, distinguished Prouse on the basis of differences between the nature of waterborne traffic in waters providing ready access to the open sea and the nature of vehicular traffic on highways.
5
While the distinctions asserted by the Court generally are valid, the Court failed to explain how these distinctions eliminate the need to limit the discretion of officers in the field. This Note argues that the Court applied the principles of its vehicle stop precedents 6 incorrectly in concluding that the fourth amendment does not proscribe suspicionless vessel boardings.
The Court's departure from its vehicle stop precedents is inconsistent with the fourth amendment. In the absence of at least an articulable suspicion of a law violation, the fourth amendment demands that pleasure boats be detained only at fixed checkpoints.
II. FACTS OF VaL.4MONTE-MARQUEZ
Near midday on March 6, 1980, Customs officers patrolling the Calcasieu River Ship Channel, 7 some eighteen miles inland from the Gulf Coast, sighted a forty-foot sailboat anchored in the channel. 8 A Louisiana state policeman accompanied the Customs officers, who were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel might be carrying marijuana. 9 After the wake created by a large freighter caused the sailboat to rock violently, the officers sighted respondent Hamparian on deck and asked if the sailboat and crew were all right. When the respondent only "shrugged his shoulders in an unresponsive manner," one Customs officer and the policeman boarded the sailboat to check the vessel's documentation under the authority of Section 1581(a).10 While examining the documentation, the Customs officer smelled what he thought was burning marijuana."I The Customs officer arrested both Hamparian and his companion, Villamonte-Marquez, after he ob-[Vol. 74 served 5,800 pounds of marijuana in burlap-wrapped bags when he looked through an open hatch. 12 At trial, respondents moved to suppress the marijuana, alleging an unlawful search and seizure of the sailboat. The District Court denied the motion and the jury found respondents guilty of violating federal drug laws. 13 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that Customs officials may board a vessel in inland waters only if they have either "reasonable suspicion of a Customs violation" or reason to believe the vessel has crossed the border. 1 4 Because at the time the officers boarded the vessel there was neither a nexus with the border nor a reasonable suspicion of a law violation, the Circuit Court ruled that the District Court had erred in denying respondents' motion to suppress. 15 Referring to a conflict among the circuits 16 
Ct. 2573 (1983).
14 Id. at 485-86.
15 Id. at 486.
16 103 S. Ct. at 2577. While the Court professed to have granted certiorari in part to resolve a conflict among the circuits, the lower courts that have dealt with the issue uniformly have required a reasonable suspicion of a law violation to support an investigatory stop of a vessel in inland waters pursuant to Section 1581 (a). See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1981) ; United States v. Guillen-Linares, 643 F.2d 1054 , 1056 (5th Cir. 1981 . The Court, however, stressed that the Villamonte-Marquez decision is limited to waters providing ready access to the open sea. Only the Fifth Circuit seems to have addressed this issue. In United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145 , 1148 (5th Cir. 1979 ), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965, cert. denied sub nom. Hernandez v. United States, 446 U.S. 910 (1980 , the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity will justify an investigatory stop of a vessel in inland waters adjacent to the open Gulf of Mexico. The circuits disagree on the standard of suspicion required to sustain a stop of a vessel in Customs waters. See United States v. Alonso, 673 F.2d 334 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978) (Customs officers may stop vessels in Customs waters in the absence of "even a modicum of suspicion"). But see United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1977) (Customs officers may stop vessels with articulable facts to support suspicion that the vessel is carrying contraband). The Odneal court, however, did not mention the fact that the boarding, which occurred 16 miles from the coast, was outside of Customs waters and therefore not within Customs' jurisdiction under Section 1581(a). See supra note 1.
17 The Court declined several opportunities to declare the case moot and thereby avoid a decision on the merits. First, the Government's deportation of respondents after the Circuit Court's reversal could have rendered the case moot. Villamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2575 n.2. Second, the Court could have found the case mooted by the Government's voluntary dismissal of respondents' indictments after the Circuit Court's reversal. Id.
Relying upon United States v. Sarmiento-Rozo, 592 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1979 , respondents contended that their deportation made the case moot. In Sarmiento-Rozo, after the District Court dismissed indictments against eight Columbian seamen charged with attempted importation of marijuana, the Government immediately deported the defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, with Justice Rehnquist speaking for the majority. 19 Recognizing that the language of Section 1581(a) seems to grant Customs officers almost unlimited authority and discretion, the Court noted that the fourth amendment 20 prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures limits such authority. In upholding the reasonableness of Section 1581(a), the Court rested its decision almost exclusively upon two arguments. First, the enactment of the lineal ancestor of Section 1581(a) by the same Congress that promulmoot because the deportation of the defendants "deprived the controversy... of any 'impact of actuality.'" Id. at 1320.
While Justice Rehnquist recognized that Sarmiento-Rozo provided "some authority for respondents' argument," he rejected the respondents' contention. illamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2575 n.2. Relying on United States v. Campos-Serano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971) , he noted that "as a collateral consequence of the convictions, the Government could bar any attempt by respondents to voluntarily re-enter this country." Id. Furthermore, if the respondents managed to re-enter the United States they would be subject to arrest and imprisonment for the convictions. Id.
Respondents also argued that the voluntary dismissal of the indictment in the District Court, following the reversal by the Court of Appeals, rendered the case moot. Apparently, no court has decided whether an indictment may be reinstated after a voluntary dismissal by the prosecution under Rule 48(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. The majority in Villamonle-Masquez held that a successful effort by the Government to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals would reinstate the judgment of conviction because upon a defendant's conviction, an indictment is merged into the conviction and the sentencing. 103 S. Ct. at 2576 n.2. In his dissent, however, Justice Brennan correctly noted that the doctrine of merger means only "that the indictment can be attacked on appeal from the conviction, and if it is defective, the entire conviction and sentence falls." Id. at 2584 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan distinguished Villamonte-Marquez from cases in which the Court has allowed appeals from a mandatory dismissal entered to comply with a lower court's mandate. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) . In Villamonte-Marquez, however, the Government was not compelled to dismiss the indictment and Manctsi is not applicable.
Finally, the Court could have refused certiorari because the United States permitted both the stay and an extension granted by the Court of Appeals to expire before it filed its petition for writ of certiorari. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2583 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18 25 Section 31 of the Act of August 4, 1790 grants Customs officials almost identical authority to that granted by 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The Act was adopted during the second session of the First Congress. During its first session, the First Congress had promulgated the Act of July 31, 1789, which had not granted such broad authority to Customs officials.
Section 24 of the 1789 Act granted Customs officials the authority to enter vessels in which they had reason to suspect dutiable goods were concealed. Act of July 31, 1789 , ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1845 . Section 24 was re-enacted by the First Congress in 1790, with only minor punctuation changes, as Section 48 of the Act of August 4, 1790. Section 31 of the 1790 Act, however, granted Customs officials broader authority to board "vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States" for the purposes of demanding manifests and of searching the vessels, the cabin, and every other part of the vessel." Act of August 5, 1790 , ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (1845 .
It is unclear why Congress omitted the "reason to suspect" standard contained in Section 24 of the 1789 Act and Section 48 of the 1790 Act. Two facts may explain the lack of an explicit standard in Section 31. The two provisions appear to serve different purposes: the primary purpose of Section 31 was to provide for manifest checks, while that of Section 48 was to provide for inspections for dutiable goods. Since Section 31 also grants almost identical authority to inspect for dutiable goods without any suspicion, this argument seems unsatisfactory. Alternatively, Section 31 could grant broader authority because it was intended to provide a more effective law enforcement tool. While the 1789 Act was entitled "An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties," Congress entitled the 1790 Act "An Act to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties."
26 Villamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 272 (1973) the Court noted that its focus in fourth amendment law has been on the reasonableness of the governmental intrusions. 28 The Court has analyzed the reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice by balancing the practice's intrusion on an individual's fourth amendment interests against its promotion of substantial governmental interests.
29
In Villamonte-Marquez, the Court began by examining the balance previously struck in its vehicle stop and search cases. 30 The majority noted that these past decisions generally required that officers stop citizens at roadblock-type stops or on the basis of some degree of particularized suspicion. Justice Rehnquist contended that the less intrusive and less awesome nature of fixed checkpoints was responsible in part for the difference in outcomes between the roving patrol stop struck down in The Court, however, distinguished investigatory stops of vessels in waters offering ready access to the open sea from stops of automobiles on principal thoroughfares in the border area. 3 5 First, permanent checkpoints like those upheld in Martinez-Fuerte are not "practical on waters such as these where vessels can move in any direction at any time and need not follow established 'avenues' as automobiles must do." '36 Second, documentation requirements applicable to vessels differ significantly from the system of vehicle licensing that prevails generally 30 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (in the absence of at least a reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to law, the fourth amendment prohibits stopping an automobile at random to check driver's license and vehicle registration); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (the fourth amendment permits stopping an automobile at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants, even where there is no reason to believe the particular car contains illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1974) (the fourth amendment forbids stopping an automobile at random to ask the occupants about their citizenship without reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (the fourth amendment prohibits the search of an automobile, without probable cause or consent, on a road at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border). After distinguishing Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerle, the Court balanced the competing interests, ignoring the balance previously struck in the automobile stop cases. The Court found that the need to make document checks is great and that enforcement of documentation laws substantially furthers the public interest.
4 1 The Court deemed the resultant intrusion on fourth amendment interests to be quite limited, involving "only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit public areas of the vessel, and inspect documents. '42 Because the government interest in assuring compliance with documentation laws is substantial, particularly in waters where the need to deter smuggling is great, and While pleasure vessels need not be documented, 46 U.S.C. § 65(1), all undocumented vessels equipped with any type of propulsion machinery must have a state-issued number displayed on the exterior of the vessel, 46 U.S.C. § § 1466, 1470 (1976) , and a certificate of number available for inspection on the vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 1469(a) (1976) .
The master of every vessel which is required to make entry upon arriving in the United States must have on board a "manifest." 19 U.S.C. § 1431(a). Such vessels of foreign registry, must deliver a copy of the "manifest" td Customs officials. 19 U.S.C. § § 1431, 1439. Before foreign vessels proceed from one Customs district to another, the master must obtain a permit to proceed. 46 U.S.C. § 313 (1958) . Before any vessel departs American waters, its master must deliver its manifest to Customs officials and obtain clearance. 46 U.S.C. § 91 (1958) .
41 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. The Court found that the documentation laws are "the linchpin for regulation of participation in certain trades, such as fishing, salvaging, towing, and dredging, as well as areas in which trade is sanctioned, and for enforcement of various environmental laws." Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that documentation checks play a vital role in the collection of duties, assist the Government in preventing the smuggling of contraband, and contribute to ensuring safety on American waterways. Id. the resultant intrusion is only modest, the Court concluded that the boarding was consistent with the fourth amendment. 45 In a footnote, Justice Brennan also attacked the "impressive historical pedigree" of Section 1581(a), relying in part upon Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927) . VillamonteMasquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2586 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan first contended that Section 31 authorized suspicionless boardings of only those vessels that were bound to the United States. Section 31 authorized the boarding of vessels "in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States. . . ." Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 165 (1845) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan contended that the phrase "if bound to the United States" qualifies both clauses that precede it. Villamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2586 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority rejected Justice Brennan's construction of Section 31, recognizing the absurdity of a statute that would authorize the boarding of a vessel found "in any part of the United States" only if that vessel were "bound to the United States." Id. at 2578 n.4.
Justice Brennan also argued that, to preserve Section 48's "reason to suspect" standard, Section 31 must be read to apply only to ships entering the country. Id. at 2586 n.7; see also supra note 25. Justice Rehnquist noted in the majority opinion that Section 48 applied only to searches and seizures of dutiable goods, while only Section 31 deals with boardings to inspect documents. Id. at 2578 n.4. Because the two sections were concerned with different matters, nothing in one section could be read to limit the other. Section 31's broad grant of authority to search for and seize dutiable goods, however, undermines Justice Rehnquist's argument.
The First Congress may have intended the "reason to suspect" standard to apply only to those vessels that were either on the high seas or within four leagues of the coast, but not bound for the United States. While Section 31 only applied to those vessels that were either in the United States or within four leagues of the coast and bound for the United States, Section 48 included no similar jurisdictional restriction.
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927), the Court had recognized that "it was not until the enactment of the present statute in 1922 that Congress purported to authorize suspicionless boardings of vessels without regard to whether there had been any border crossing." Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2586 n.7. The majority correctly noted that Justice Brennan had misread Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Maul. Id. at 2578 n.4. In Maul, Justice Brandeis was referring to a change that Congress had made to a predecessor of Section 1581 (a) in 1922, omitting the phrase "if bound to the United States." 274 U.S. at 528-29. Justice Brandeis concluded that it was not until 1922 that Congress had authorized document boardings of a vessel within four leagues of the coast without regard to whether or not that vessel was bound to the United States. Id. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion offers no support for Justice Brennan's position, however, because the vessel stopped in Villamonte-Marquez was in inland waters, and not Customs waters. See supra note 1.
46 See supra note 30.
fixed checkpoints instead of roving patrols. '47 Reaffirming the need to limit the discretion of officers in the field, Justice Brennan took issue with the majority's departure from Brzgnoni-Pnce and Prouse, finding three basic flaws in the reasoning of the majority.
48
First, he contended that the majority had overlooked the "primary and overarching" concern that has guided the Court in previous decisions: an unqualified and consistent rejection of "standardless and unconstrained discretion" that would subject individual liberties to the whims of police officers in the field. 49 Second, the supposed factual differences between vehicle and vessel stops are either insubstantial or of the government's own making. 50 Finally, Justice Brennan asserted that it is "a non sequitur to reason that because the police in a given situation claim to need more intrusive and arbitrary enforcement tools than the Fourth Amendment has been held to permit," the Court may dispense with the amendment's protections. . 1979) , cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980) (Customs officers observed vessel riding heavy in the bow and speeding through the intercoastal waterway and several "no wake" areas). 62 IV. ANALYSIS The Villamonte-Marquez decision is flawed in two respects. First, the majority placed too much emphasis upon the lineal ancestry of Section 1581(a). Second, in applying the fourth amendment balancing test, the majority overstated the interests of the government while understating the interests of individuals.
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE
[l7 boardings.
A. LINEAL ANCESTRY
As part of its inquiry into the constitutionality of Section 1581(a), the Court examined the constitutionality of Section 31 of the Act of August 4, 1790, which was the lineal ancestor of Section 1581(a). Justice Rehnquist contended that the enactment of Section 31 demonstrated that the first Congress believed it was reasonable to allow Customs officers to board vessels to search for dutiable goods without any suspicion of customs violations. 63 REv. 725, 727 (1980) . 72 Officers may conduct warrantless searches of vessels without any suspicion of a law violation where they have grounds to believe the vessel has entered from international waters. See,e.g., United States v. Ingham, 502 F.2d 1287 , 1291 -92 (5th Cir. 1974 ),cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975 (upholding warrantless non-probable cause search of a vessel where sightings of the vessel "proved quite convincingly that the vessel had been at a foreign port or place"); cf. United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980) (refusing to uphold search of vessel as a border search because officers did not have articulable facts from which they could reasonably infer that the boat had come from international waters).
Entrance into the United States justifies border searches even when they are conducted without warrants and without suspicion. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) . The Court has stated that "[t]ravellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (dictum).
Border searches, however, may be conducted only at the border or its functional equivalent. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). The Court has noted two functional equivalents of the border: (1) an established checkpoint at the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border; and (2) a domestic airport upon the arrival of a non-stop flight from another country. Id.
The border search exception did not apply in Villamonte-Marquez because there were no grounds to believe that the vessel had entered from international waters. The Court only [Vol. 74 ministrative searches of pervasively regulated industries. 73 In VillamonteMarquez, however, only the "stop and frisk" and the automobile exceptions provide guidance in determining whether the boarding was reasonable.
The "stop and frisk" exception, as typified by Terry v. Ohio , 74 and the automobile exception, as typified by Carroll v. United States, 75 are both based upon unforeseeable encounters that present officers only a fleeting opportunity to conduct a search. In both situations the Court relied on the limited nature of the intrusion and the strong governmental need for swift action.
The Terry Court authorized a warrantless "stop and frisk" detention of a suspect where officers had reason to believe that the individual was armed and dangerous. 76 The stop did not require probable cause because a limited search for weapons entails a lesser intrusion than a full-scale search. 77 Although Tery was predicated upon swift action necessitated by on-the-spot observations, the Court warned that "police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. '78 Under the "automobile exception," law enforcement officers may considered the issue of whether Customs officers could stop a vessel in inland waters to check its documentation. 103 S. Ct. at 2575. 73 The "administrative search" exception to the warrant requirement generally has been restricted to those businesses that historically have been subjected to close government regula- In Almeida-Sanchez, the Court refused to extend the administrative search exception to include searches of automobiles. Users of automobiles are not businessmen who must accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade in a regulated industry. 413 U.S. at 271. While the exception may extend to commercial vessels because of the long history of maritime regulation, it cannot be applied to pleasure boats. The Court in Vllamonte-Marquez rightly ignored the administrative search exception in its analysis.
74 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (a veteran police officer, suspecting three men of "casing" a store, spun one man around, patted the outside of his clothing, and found a revolver).
75 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Federal prohibition agents, passing a car that they reasonably believed was transporting illegal liquor, stopped and searched the car without a warrant).
76 392 U.S. at 27. conduct warrantless searches of automobiles where they have probable cause to believe that contraband is present. The Carroll Court recognized that often "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." 79 Again, however, the Court warned that "where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used. .. ."80 The Court analyzed Villamonle-Marquez in the context of the automobile investigatory detention cases, 8 ' which are a hybrid of the "stop and frisk" exception and the "automobile exception." While vehicle detention cases are characterized by the mobility that concerned the Court in Carroll, they also exhibit the lesser intrusion that the Court addressed in Te7y. Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, investigatory stops 82 by roving patrols do not require probable cause, but only articulable and reasonable suspicion of a law violation. 8 3 Where roving patrols conduct such stops, the police must comply with the reasonable suspicion standard because the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement demands that the government be restrained from exercising "broad and unlimited discretion" when conducting investigatory stops. 84 Suspicionless detentions at fixed checkpoints are constitutionally permissible because they are less intrusive and involve less discretionary enforcement activity than those conducted by roving patrols.8
5
As the Court stated in Prouse, "the permissibility of a particular law 79 267 U.S. at 153. 80 Id. at 156. The Court has not adhered to its warning that police must obtain a warrant where it is practicable. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (upholding a warrantless seizure of an automobile and search of its exterior at a police impoundment area after police had arrested the owner and removed the car from a public lot); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (upholding an unwarranted search of a car after the occupants had been arrested and the car had been driven to the police station). The Cardwell court cited another distinguishing factor in automobile cases: "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as a repository of personal effects. The question of the constitutionality of a particular law enforcement practice does not end with the determination that the government has substantial interests at stake. The Court must determine whether the practice sufficiently furthers the government interests to justify its intrusion upon fourth amendment interests. Finding no evidence to the contrary, the Prouse Court assumed that "finding an unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe of drivers." 440 U.S. at 659. Therefore, the Court concluded that random checks did not substantially further the Government's interest in highway safety. 93 The Court argued that it is difficult to draw lines between commercial vessels and pleasure boats: "Respondents assert that they were in a 'pleasure boat,' yet they proved to be involved in a highly lucrative commercial trade." Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581 n.6.
The Supreme Court cannot partially justify a warrantless search by measuring the yields of that search. Searches must be reasonable at the time they are conducted: "[A] search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (footnote omitted). One commentator has noted: "[U]nless the Fourth Amendment controls tompeeping and subjects it to a requirement of antecedent cause to believe that what is inside any particular window is indeed criminal, police may look through windows and observe a thousand innocent acts for every guilty act they spy out." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 403 (1974). pered by requiring Customs officers to have at least reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before boarding pleasure boats. In fact, as Justice Brennan noted, the case law suggests that maritime smuggling operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators. The majority seemed to assert that the government's need for suspicionless boardings was especially substantial because no effective alternative exists for enforcement of documentation laws. Since the balance struck by the Court in the vehicle stop precedents only permits suspicionless document checks at fixed checkpoints, 95 the majority's holding turned upon their conclusion that "no reasonable claim can be made that permanent checkpoints would be practical on waters . . . where vessels can move in any direction at any time and need not follow established 'avenues' as automobiles must do." 9 6 Justice Brennan, however, noted that the boarding took place in a ship channel, which provided an opportunity for effective fixed checkpoint inspection.
97
Even if fixed checkpoints were impractical in the Villamonte-Marquez case, the Court's previous search and seizure cases do not support the conclusion that the fourth amendment permits suspicionless stops. Justice Rehnquist ignored the central requirement of Carroll, Tery, BrzinoniPonce, Martinez-Fueree and their progeny: the Court has consistently insisted that "standardless and unconstrained. . . discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." 9 8 The majority in Villamonte-Marquez made no attempt to restrain the discretion of Customs officers acting pursuant to Section 1581 (a), apparently concluding that, because the nature of waterborne commerce in waters providing ready access to the open sea makes the use of fixed checkpoints impractical, the fourth amendment requires no limit on the discretion of Customs officers.
After overstating the governmental interest in conducting random documentation checks, 99 the Court substantially understated the resulting impact upon vessel owners' expectations of privacy. Even without the physical intrusion of an actual boarding, a stop to check documents is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment and therefore is governed by its reasonableness requirement. 1°°T he Prouse Court characterized the physical and psychological intrusions that result from random document checks of automobiles as involving an unsettling show of authority, interfering with freedom of movement, and creating substantial anxiety.
10 ' Vessel occupants have even greater privacy expectations than do passengers in automobiles. Vessels are more likely to serve as residences, even if only temporarily. 102 While the majority deemed investigatory detentions to be only a minor inconvenience, safety and documentation checks may encompass a significantly greater intrusion than automobile stops, including a thorough examination of virtually all areas of the vessel.
10 3 As Justice Brennan realized, the intrusion upheld here was substantial; it not only involved "a mere stopping and questioning. . . but an actual boarding of a private vessel. . . more similar to entry of a private house than to the stops in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse.' 0 4
The Court incorrectly struck the balance between the governmental interests furthered by random vessel boardings and the intrusion on fourth amendment interests that boardings entail. The basic objective of the fourth amendment "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."' 0 5
Absent some restriction on the discretion of officers in the field, the intrusion on vessel occupants' privacy expectations outweighs the governmental interests furthered by such boardings.
The Villamonte-Marquez decision effectively authorizes the use of suspicionless document boardings as a pretext for conducting smuggling investigations. Even if the Court was correct in its conclusion that such random stops are necessary to further the government's interest, the Court could have imposed constraints upon the authority of Customs officials conducting document checks pursuant to Section 1581 (a). Such constraints would limit officer discretion and thereby reduce the intrusion upon vessel occupants' privacy expectations. First, the Court could have required document checks to be conducted in a reasonable and unintrusive manner, prohibiting, for example, Customs officials from conducting such document checks at night. Second, the inspections could have been limited to examination of documents and papers unless probable cause develops to support an increase in the scope of the search. Courts should not permit vessel identification checks to take officials into the living areas of any vessel, without either probable cause or consent of the owners. Finally, the Court could have required officials, before boarding, to give a statement to the vessel occupants delineating both the purpose of the boarding and the permissible scope of the inspection.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Villamonte-Marquez allows Customs officers to substantially invade the fourth amendment rights of citizens without sufficiently furthering a substantial government interest. Furthermore, the decision offers citizens no protection from Customs officials, who may now use their unconstrained discretion to stop, board and search any vessel in inland waters providing ready access to the open sea without any suspicion of wrongdoing.
Random vessel boardings are not consistent with the fourth amendment. A requirement of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity would adequately protect the public interest because random document inspections of pleasure boats are unlikely to further the public interest in enforcement of documentation laws. While the intrusiveness of vessel boardings exceeds that of the automobile stop invalidated in Delaware v. Prouse, such random detentions are no more likely to further the professed governmental interest. Since maritime smuggling activities tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying smugglers, a reasonable suspicion requirement would minimize the intrusion upon the rights of individuals and, at the same time, allow law enforcement officials sufficient authority to detect smuggling and other law violations.
